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OPINION 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 These consolidated appeals arise out of a construction 
trades jurisdictional dispute concerning whether certain work 
on a public building should be conducted by sheet metal 
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workers or by carpenters.  Sheet Metal Workers’ International 
Association, Local 27, AFL-CIO (“Sheet Metal”) petitions 
this Court for review of the decision and order of the National 
Labor Relations Board (“the Board” or “NLRB”) of 
December 8, 2011, finding that Sheet Metal violated the 
National Labor Relations Act by maintaining a section 301 
suit against E.P. Donnelly, Inc. (“Donnelly”) and Sambe 
Construction Company, Inc. (“Sambe”) following the Board’s 
decision in a section 10(k) proceeding to assign the disputed 
work to the New Jersey Regional Council of Carpenters and 
the United States Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America, Local 623 (“Carpenters”).  The Board cross-
petitions for enforcement of its order.  Also before this Court 
are three appeals from orders of the District Court entered in 
connection with the jurisdictional labor dispute.  Donnelly 
appeals from an order of the District Court granting summary 
judgment in favor of Sheet Metal on its breach of contract 
claim and awarding Sheet Metal $365,349.75 in 
compensatory damages.  Sheet Metal appeals the District 
Court’s award of nominal damages of $1.00 against Sambe, 
and Sambe cross-appeals against Sheet Metal on the matters 
of contract liability and damages.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will deny Sheet Metal’s petition for review; grant the 
Board’s petition for enforcement of its December 8, 2011 
decision and order; vacate the judgment of the District Court 
in favor of Sheet Metal on the breach of contract claims 
against Donnelly and Sambe; and remand the case to the 
District Court with directions to enter judgment in favor of 
Donnelly and to conduct further proceedings with respect to 
Sheet Metal’s contract claim asserted against Sambe.  
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
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 In 2006, Egg Harbor Township, located in Atlantic 
County, New Jersey, authorized the construction of the Egg 
Harbor Township Community Center (“the Project”).  In 
accordance with New Jersey law governing public works 
projects, the Township adopted a project labor agreement 
(“the PLA” or “Agreement”), which governed the terms and 
conditions of the Project’s construction.1  All contractors 
working on the Project were required to become signatories to 
                                              
 
1
  New Jersey law authorizes public entities to adopt 
project labor agreements to govern public works projects  
 
if the public entity determines, 
taking into consideration the size, 
complexity and cost of the public 
works project, that, with respect 
to that project the project labor 
agreement will meet the 
requirements of section 5 of this 
act, including promoting labor 
stability and advancing the 
interests of the public entity in 
cost, efficiency, skilled labor 
force, quality, safety and 
timeliness.  
N.J.S.A. § 52:38-3 (2002).  The statute further provides that 
“[a]ny project labor agreement negotiated pursuant to this act 
between the public entity or its representative or a 
construction manager and one or more labor organizations 
shall be binding on all contractors and subcontractors 
working on the public works project . . . .”  Id. § 52:38-4. 
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the PLA.  The PLA also contained a “supremacy provision,” 
which provided that the PLA “together with the local 
Collective Bargaining Agreements appended hereto as 
Schedule A represent[] the complete understanding of all 
signatories and supersede[] any national agreement, local 
agreement or other collective bargaining agreement of any 
type which would otherwise apply to this Project(s), in whole 
or in part” (“the Supremacy Clause”).  (Board Appeals Joint 
Appendix [“B. J.A.”] 100.) 
 
 Sambe was selected as the general contractor on the 
Project and, as required, became a signatory to the PLA.  In 
early 2007, Sambe subcontracted the Project roofing work to 
Donnelly.  In accordance with the PLA’s requirement that 
general contractors obtain signed letters of assent from all 
subcontractors hired to work on the Project, on March 30, 
2007, Donnelly executed a letter of assent in which it 
consented to be bound by the terms and conditions of the 
PLA, and further agreed that any party it selected to perform 
the roofing work would also be required to become a 
signatory to the PLA.  
 
 A dispute arose when Donnelly selected Carpenters to 
perform the roofing work, even though Carpenters was not a 
signatory to the PLA.  Donnelly apparently hired Carpenters 
because the two were parties to a collective bargaining 
agreement (“CBA”).2  Sheet Metal, which was a signatory to 
                                              
 
2
  Both Donnelly and Sambe are signatories to CBAs 
with Carpenters.  Before the District Court, the parties 
disputed whether Donnelly and Sambe assented to Sheet 
Metal’s CBA and whether its CBA was appended to the PLA. 
The District Court in its March 26, 2010 decision awarding 
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the PLA, protested the work assignment and informed 
Donnelly that Carpenters could not complete the Project 
because it had not executed the PLA.  Carpenters, in turn, 
threatened to picket if Donnelly reassigned the roofing work 
to Sheet Metal.  Although Donnelly created conflicting 
contractual obligations by assenting to both the Carpenters’ 
CBA and the PLA, it refused to reassign the work to Sheet 
Metal.   
 
 In an attempt to settle the work dispute, Sheet Metal 
initiated an arbitration proceeding pursuant to Article 10 of 
the PLA.
3
  An arbitration hearing was held before arbitrator 
Stanley Aiges.  Donnelly, Sambe, and Sheet Metal 
participated in the hearing; Carpenters, although made aware 
                                                                                                     
Sheet Metal damages concluded that Sheet Metal’s CBA was 
appended to the PLA and was thus binding on Donnelly.  See 
Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 27 v. E.P. 
Donnelly, Inc., No. 07-3023, 2010 WL 1257741, at *4 
(D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2010) (“Sheet Metal III”).  The parties 
apparently do not challenge this conclusion on appeal.   
 
 
3
  Article 10 sets forth the procedure for resolving 
jurisdictional disputes between unions and contractors.  In 
summary, a union disputing the assignment of Project-related 
work is required to submit its objection in writing to a 
designated administrator, in accordance with the procedure 
set forth in Article 10.  The dispute is then submitted to an 
arbitrator, whose award is “final and binding on the disputing 
Local Unions and the involved Contractor on this Project 
only, and may be enforced in any court of competent 
jurisdiction.”  (B. J.A. 122.)  
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of the hearing, did not appear at the proceeding.
4
  On June 15, 
2007, Arbitrator Aiges issued a short form arbitration 
decision awarding the disputed work to Sheet Metal (“the 
Aiges arbitration award”).5   
 
 Carpenters nonetheless persisted in its assertion that it 
would picket the Project if the work were assigned to Sheet 
Metal.  Donnelly subsequently filed an unfair labor practice 
charge with the Board pursuant to section 10(k) of the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”), 29 
U.S.C. § 160(k), alleging that Carpenters violated section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(D) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(D), “by 
engaging in proscribed activity [threatening to picket] with an 
object of forcing [Donnelly] to continue to assign certain 
work to employees it represents rather than to employees 
represented by [Sheet Metal].”6  United Bhd. of Carpenters & 
                                              
 
4
  Carpenters did, however, submit a letter to Aiges 
objecting to his jurisdiction to resolve the work dispute and to 
the validity of the PLA generally.  
 
 
5
  On July 2, 2007, Aiges issued a long form arbitration 
award confirming the short form decision.  
 
 
6
  Section 8(b)(4)(ii) makes it is an unfair labor 
practice for a labor organization  
 
to threaten, coerce, or restrain any 
person engaged in commerce or in 
an industry affecting commerce, 
where in either case an object 
thereof is –  
. . . 
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Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 623, 351 N.L.R.B. 1417, 
1417 (2007) (“Local Union No. 623”).  The regional director 
for the NLRB ordered a section 10(k) hearing to determine 
the work jurisdiction dispute.
7
 
 
 While Donnelly’s unfair labor practice charge against 
Carpenters was pending, Sheet Metal filed a grievance against 
                                                                                                     
(D) forcing or requiring any 
employer to assign particular 
work to employees in a particular 
labor organization or in a 
particular trade, craft, or class 
rather than to employees in 
another labor organization or in 
another trade, craft, or class . . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(D) (2012). 
 
 
7
  Under section 10(k) of the Act,  
 
[w]henever it is charged that any person 
has engaged in an unfair labor practice 
within the meaning of [section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(D)] of this title, the Board is 
empowered and directed to hear and 
determine the dispute out of which such 
unfair labor practice shall have arisen, 
[unless the dispute is resolved by the 
parties within 10 days]. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (2012). 
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Sambe and Donnelly with the Local Joint Adjustment Board 
(“the LJAB”) pursuant to its own CBA, seeking to confirm 
the Aiges arbitration award because Donnelly had not yet 
assigned the disputed work to Sheet Metal.
8
  Donnelly and 
Sambe were invited to participate in the LJAB proceeding, 
but both declined.  Donnelly objected to the LJAB’s 
jurisdiction.  One month later, on July 25, 2007, the LJAB 
issued its decision, finding that Sambe and Donnelly violated 
the PLA and Sheet Metal’s CBA by assigning the roofing 
work to Carpenters and failing to comply with the Aiges 
award.  The LJAB further held that if the work was not 
reassigned to Sheet Metal, Sambe and Donnelly would be 
jointly liable to Sheet Metal for $428,319.26 in lost wages 
and benefits.  
 
 In the meantime, on June 29, 2007, Sheet Metal filed 
suit against Donnelly and Carpenters in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to 
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1974 
(“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185,9 seeking declaratory and 
                                              
 
8
  Sheet Metal’s CBA provides an alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism for settling work disputes between the 
union and employers: “Grievances not settled as provided in 
Section 1 of this Article may be appealed by either party to 
the Local Joint Adjustment Board . . . . [A] decision of the 
Local Joint Adjustment Board shall be final and binding.”  
(District Court Appeals Join Appendix [“D.C. J.A.”] 146.) 
 
 
9
  Section 301 of the LMRA authorizes “[s]uits for 
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 
organization representing employees in an industry affecting 
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monetary relief, as well as a preliminary injunction to enforce 
the Aiges arbitration award.
10
  Sheet Metal filed an amended 
complaint in August, 2007, adding a claim against Donnelly 
for failure to abide by the LJAB arbitration award and joining 
Sambe as a defendant.  
 
 On December 31, 2007, the Board issued a decision 
and order resolving Donnelly’s unfair labor practice charge 
against Carpenters.  See Local Union No. 623, 351 N.L.R.B. 
at 1417.  Finding that it had jurisdiction pursuant to section 
10(k) of the Act, the Board awarded the disputed roofing 
work to Carpenters, “relying on the factors of employer 
preference, current assignment and past practice, and 
economy and efficiency of operations.”  Id. at 1422.  
Notwithstanding this award, Sheet Metal continued to pursue 
its section 301 lawsuit against Donnelly in the District Court.  
On January 11, 2008, Donnelly filed a second unfair labor 
practice charge with the Board, this time against Sheet Metal 
and asserting that Sheet Metal’s continued pursuit of the 
section 301 action after the Board issued the section 10(k) 
order constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of 
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) because it sought reassignment of work 
in contravention of a section 10(k) order of the Board.   
 
 On March 27, 2008, the District Court denied Sambe 
and Donnelly’s motions to vacate the Aiges arbitration award, 
finding that it could not evaluate the motions because a 
                                                                                                     
commerce . . . or between any such labor organizations . . . .”  
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2013). 
 
 
10
  Carpenters was eventually dismissed from the suit. 
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decision on the validity of the PLA was “premature at [that] 
time.”  (D.C. J.A. 20.)  The District Court did, however, 
“touch upon the . . . [parties’] dispute regarding the preclusive 
effect of the 10(k) decision rendered by the NLRB on 
December 31, 2007,” and emphasized that it “disagree[d]” 
with Donnelly’s argument that because the Board awarded 
the disputed work to Carpenters, “there is no monetary 
remedy for [Sheet Metal] even if the PLA is valid and 
[Donnelly and Sambe] breached that contract.”11  (D.C. J.A. 
21.) 
 
 In April, 2008, the Board issued a complaint against 
Sheet Metal, contending that its continued maintenance of the 
section 301 suit following the Board’s section 10(k) order 
was an unfair labor practice in violation of section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(D) of the NLRA.
12
  Following a hearing, on May 
                                              
 
11
  The District Court did, however, grant Sambe and 
Donnelly’s motions to vacate the LJAB award.  Sheet Metal 
does not challenge that aspect of the District Court’s ruling, 
and thus we will not address it.  
 
 
12
  That month, the Board also petitioned to stay Sheet 
Metal’s section 301 suit pending its resolution of Donnelly’s 
unfair labor practice charge against Sheet Metal.  On 
September 2, 2008, the District Court denied the Board’s 
petition and declined to temporarily stay the section 301 suit.  
See Moore-Duncan v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 
Local 27, 624 F. Supp. 2d 367, 377 (D.N.J. 2008).  The Board 
appealed, and this Court ordered the appeal be deferred 
pending disposition of these consolidated appeals.  See 
Moore-Duncan v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 
14 
 
29, 2008, an administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) found that 
Sheet Metal violated the NLRA by maintaining the section 
301 suit against Donnelly and Sambe after the Board issued 
its section 10(k) order.  Sheet Metal filed exceptions and a 
supporting brief.   
 
 On June 25, 2008, after the Project was completed, 
Sheet Metal filed a second amended complaint in its section 
301 action.  Sheet Metal no longer requested reassignment of 
the Project work, but instead sought monetary damages 
against Sambe and Donnelly for breach of contract and 
violations of N.J.S.A. § 52:38-1 et. seq., as well as a 
declaratory judgment that Donnelly and Sambe are bound by 
the Aiges arbitration award.  Sheet Metal, Sambe, and 
Donnelly subsequently filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment.   
 
 In December, 2009, the District Court rendered its 
decision on the parties’ summary judgment motions.  See 
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 27 v. E.P. 
Donnelly, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 2d 313 (D.N.J. 2009) (“Sheet 
Metal I”).  The District Court first granted summary judgment 
in favor of Donnelly and Sambe on Sheet Metal’s claims for 
violations of the New Jersey statute authorizing project labor 
agreements, N.J.S.A. 52:38-1 et seq.
13
  Id. at 331.  But the 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Sheet 
Metal on the breach of contract claims, finding that both 
                                                                                                     
Union 27, No. 08-4437 (3d Cir. May 31, 2012) (order 
deferring disposition).  
 
 
13
  Sheet Metal does not appeal this portion of the 
District Court’s decision. 
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Donnelly and Sambe breached the PLA.  See id.  The District 
Court later awarded Sheet Metal $1.00 in nominal damages 
against Sambe.  See Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local 
Union No. 27 v. E.P. Donnelly, Inc., No. 07-3023, 2010 WL 
905616, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 9, 2010) (“Sheet Metal II”).  
Following a bench trial on the issue of Donnelly’s liability for 
compensatory damages, the District Court awarded Sheet 
Metal $365,349.75.  See Sheet Metal III, 2010 WL 1257741, 
at *9.  The parties timely filed their respective appeals and 
cross-appeal.    
 
 On December 8, 2011, the Board issued a decision and 
order affirming and reversing in part the ALJ’s August 18, 
2008 decision with respect to Donnelly’s unfair labor practice 
charge against Sheet Metal.  The Board held that Sheet 
Metal’s section 301 suit against Donnelly was an unfair labor 
practice in violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) because it 
“directly conflict[ed] with the Board’s 10(k) award.”  Sheet 
Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 27, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 
at *4 (Dec. 8, 2011).  The Board then “modif[ied] the [ALJ’s] 
remedy to require that [Sheet Metal] withdraw its lawsuit 
against Donnelly in its entirety.”  Id.  However, the Board 
reversed the ALJ’s decision with respect to Sambe, finding 
that Sheet Metal’s claim against Sambe, the general 
contractor, did not conflict with the section 10(k) award and 
therefore did not constitute an unfair labor practice.  Id. at *2.  
Sheet Metal timely petitioned this Court for review of the 
Board’s December 8, 2011 order, and the Board filed a cross-
petition for enforcement.    
 
II. THE BOARD’S DECEMBER 8, 2011 DECISION 
AND ORDER 
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 We have jurisdiction to review a decision and order of 
the Board pursuant to section 10 of the NLRA.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 160(e)-(f); see also NLRB v. Cedar Tree Press, Inc., 169 
F.3d 794, 795 (3d Cir. 1999).  “We review [the Board’s] 
factual findings to determine whether they are supported by 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.”  Local 30, 
United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers v. NLRB, 1 F.3d 
1419, 1422 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Gundle II”).  In doing so, we 
exercise care not to “displace the Board’s factual inferences 
even if [we] would have reached a different conclusion on de 
novo review.”  NLRB v. Omnitest Inspection Servs., Inc., 937 
F.2d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 1991).  Although appellate review of 
legal questions raised in an NLRB decision and order is 
plenary, Cedar Tree Press, 169 F.3d at 795, the Board’s 
interpretation of the Act is entitled to deference.  St. Margaret 
Mem’l Hosp. v. NLRB, 991 F.2d 1146, 1151 (3d Cir. 1993).  
“We must enforce a Board order that rests upon an 
interpretation of the Act that is not ‘an unreasonable or 
unprincipled construction of the statute . . . .’”  Gundle II, 1 
F.3d at 1422 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 
497 (1979)).   
 
 Sheet Metal advances two theories in support of its 
argument that the Board’s December 8, 2011 decision is 
unenforceable.  First, Sheet Metal argues that the Board did 
not have jurisdiction to issue the December 31, 2007 section 
10(k) order in which it found that Carpenters was entitled to 
the disputed work.  Alternatively, Sheet Metal contends that 
even if the Board had jurisdiction to issue the December 31, 
2007 decision and order, it erroneously concluded that Sheet 
Metal violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) by pursuing the section 
301 case after the section 10(k) order issued.  We will address 
each argument in turn.   
17 
 
 
A. 
 
 The Board has jurisdiction to resolve alleged violations 
of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) pursuant to section 10(k) of the 
NLRA, which provides:  
 
Whenever it is charged that any 
person has engaged in an unfair 
labor practice within the meaning 
of [section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D)], the 
Board is empowered and directed 
to hear and determine the dispute 
out of which such unfair labor 
practice shall have arisen, unless, 
within ten days after notice that 
such charge has been filed, the 
parties to such dispute submit to 
the Board satisfactory evidence 
that they have adjusted, or agreed 
upon methods for the voluntary 
adjustment of, the dispute. 
 
See 29 U.S.C. § 160(k).  To exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 
section 10(k), the Board must find “there is reasonable cause 
to believe that Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act has been 
violated.”  See In re Int’l Alliance of Theatrical & Stage 
Employees, 337 N.L.R.B. 721, 723 (2002).  The Board 
conducts a three-step inquiry to determine whether this 
standard has been satisfied, examining whether there is  
 
reasonable cause to believe that 
(1) a union has used a proscribed 
18 
 
means – such as picketing or 
threatening to picket – to enforce 
its claim to the work in dispute; 
(2) there are competing claims to 
the disputed work between rival 
groups of employees; and (3) 
there is no agreed-upon method 
for resolving the dispute 
voluntarily. 
 
Recon Refractory & Constr. Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.3d 980, 988 
(9th Cir. 2005).  Once the Board determines that these three 
requirements are met, it “will award the disputed work to one 
or the other of the vying unions, based on considerations such 
as the employer’s past practice, industry custom, and contract 
rights.”  Id.   
 
 Only the third requirement is disputed here.  Sheet 
Metal contends that the PLA dispute-resolution section 
provides the appropriate agreed-upon mechanism to resolve 
the work jurisdiction dispute.     
 
 “For the Board to find that the parties have agreed 
upon a method for the voluntary adjustment to a dispute, all 
parties must agree to be bound by the method.”  Local 3-90, 
W. States Reg’l Council No. 3, 261 N.L.R.B. 615, 617 (1982); 
accord Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, 316 
N.L.R.B. 360, 361 n.3 (1995) (“Local 150”).  Where there 
exists an agreed-upon method for settlement of jurisdictional 
disputes, the Board will decline section 10(k) jurisdiction.  
See William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of 
Jacksonville & Vicinity, 417 U.S. 12, 18 (1974).  The Board 
has explained that it does so to further Congress’s preference, 
19 
 
as expressed through the NLRA, for voluntary resolution of 
labor disputes.  See id.  However, where no agreed-upon 
method exists, the Board will exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 
section 10(k) and resolve the work dispute itself.  See Local 
150,  316 N.L.R.B. at 361. 
 
 In its December 31, 2007 decision and order resolving 
Donnelly’s unfair labor practice charge against Carpenters, 
the Board first determined that it had jurisdiction to resolve 
the work dispute between Donnelly, the employer, and 
Carpenters and Sheet Metal, the unions disputing the work 
assignment.  See Local Union No. 623, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1419.  
The Board rejected Sheet Metal’s argument that an agreed-
upon method of dispute resolution existed because the PLA 
contained such a mechanism, reasoning that Carpenters was 
not a signatory to the PLA “and therefore is not bound to its 
dispute-resolution procedure” set forth in Article 10.  Id.  The 
Board thus concluded that “there [wa]s no agreed-upon 
voluntary method to adjust the dispute,” and therefore the 
“dispute [was] properly before [it] for determination under 
Section 10(k).”  Id.   
 
 It is undisputed that Carpenters was not a signatory to 
the PLA.  Sheet Metal acknowledges as much, but argues that 
Carpenters was nonetheless bound by the PLA pursuant to 
N.J.S.A. § 52:38-4, which provides that “[a]ny [PLA] 
negotiated pursuant to this act . . . shall be binding on all 
contractors and subcontractors working on the public works 
project . . . .”  Sheet Metal argues that Carpenters was also 
party to the PLA pursuant to the Entities Bound Clause found 
in Article 2, section 3, which provides that the PLA is binding 
on signatory unions and contractors, and “is further binding 
upon any employee of the owner, [General Contractor] or any 
20 
 
subcontractor performing work on the [Project] . . . .”  (B. 
J.A. 100.)   
 
 Article 2, section 3 further provides, however, that in 
order for a subcontractor to be bound by the PLA, “[t]he 
Contractors shall include in any subcontract that they let, for 
performance during the term of this Agreement, a 
requirement that their subcontractors, of whatever tier, 
become signatory and bound by this Agreement . . . .”  (B. 
J.A. 100) (emphasis added).  As noted above, Carpenters did 
not sign the PLA, and the CBA between Carpenters and 
Donnelly did not obligate Carpenters to become a signatory to 
the PLA.  On the contrary, the Carpenters/Donnelly CBA 
expressly provides that “[n]o project labor agreement (PLA) 
may supersede this agreement or any of its provisions or 
articles without the mutual consent of the parties,” B. J.A. 33, 
and no evidence was offered showing that Carpenters 
consented to be bound by the PLA.  
 
 Sheet Metal’s argument that Carpenters was bound by 
the PLA’s Supremacy Clause is similarly unpersuasive.  We 
agree with Sambe that the “Supremacy Clause merely 
harmonizes the PLA’s provisions with the CBAs of the 
signatory Unions, displacing any contrary CBA provisions.”  
(Sambe Combined Third Step Br. 21).  Because Carpenters 
was not a signatory to the PLA – a fact that Sheet Metal does 
not dispute – the Supremacy Clause does not apply to 
Carpenters’ CBA and cannot, as Sambe urges, trump the 
CBA between Donnelly and Carpenters and displace the 
dispute resolution mechanism contained therein.
14
      
                                              
 
14
  Alternatively, Sheet Metal argues that Carpenters 
was bound by the PLA under the doctrine of equitable 
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 Furthermore, the case law Sheet Metal cites in support 
of its position that an agreed-upon dispute resolution 
mechanism existed actually counsels in favor of reaching the 
opposite conclusion.  For example, in Sw. Reg’l Council of 
Carpenters, 348 N.L.R.B. 1250 (2006), the Board found that, 
notwithstanding the existence of a governing project service 
agreement containing a dispute resolution mechanism, there 
was no agreed-upon method because “the record show[ed] 
that there [were] potentially conflicting forums for resolving 
the disputes” among the parties.  Id. at 1254.  The Board 
expressly stated that it was “unnecessary to resolve whether 
all the parties” were actually bound by the labor agreement in 
question because the fact that the parties disputed whether 
they were bound by the agreement alone satisfied the third 
jurisdictional requirement for exercising section 10(k) 
jurisdiction.  Id.  Similarly, in Int’l Bhd. of Electrical 
Workers, Local Union No. 363, 326 N.L.R.B. 1382 (1998), 
the Board found that no agreed-upon voluntary dispute 
resolution mechanism existed where the aggrieved union was 
a signatory to a PLA which “contain[ed] a specific provision 
outlining a procedure for dealing with jurisdictional work 
disputes,” but the other parties to the 10(k) proceeding – the 
employer who made the disputed work assignment and the 
union that received the disputed work –were not signatories.  
Id. at 1384.  The Board thus concluded that it could properly 
                                                                                                     
estoppel.  However, we do not have jurisdiction to consider 
this argument because Sheet Metal never raised it before the 
Board and fails to point to any “extraordinary circumstances” 
justifying its failure to do so.  29 U.S.C. § 160(e).   
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exercise jurisdiction pursuant to section 10(k).
15
  See id.  
Indeed, where, as here, an employer has bound itself to 
conflicting labor agreements, “the Board has held that no 
determinative agreed-on method exists for resolving the 
dispute,” and thus section 10(k)’s third jurisdictional 
requirement is satisfied.  Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 
Local 318, 322 N.L.R.B. 709, 712 (1996).   
 
 Affording “due deference to the Board’s expertise in 
drawing factual inferences,” Gundle II, 1 F.3d at 1425, we 
hold that the Board’s finding that there existed no agreed-
upon voluntary dispute resolution mechanism is supported by 
substantial record evidence and is thus “conclusive.”  29 
U.S.C. § 160(e); see also Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 
Local No. 714 v. Sullivan Transfer, Inc., 650 F.2d 669, 679 
(5th Cir. 1981).  Accordingly, the Board’s determination that 
all three requirements for exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 
section 10(k) were satisfied had a “reasonable basis in law” 
and will not be disturbed on appellate review.  See Ford 
                                              
 
15
  The remaining cases relied upon by Sheet Metal in 
support of this argument are inapposite.  Enertech Elec., Inc. 
v. Mahoning Cnty. Comm’rs, 85 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 1996), 
involved an appeal from a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment, not a decision by the Board in which it determined 
that it had section 10(k) jurisdiction.  Id. at 259.  And in 
Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am., Local No. 320, 318 N.L.R.B. 
917 (1995), the parties stipulated that there was no agreed-
upon method for voluntary dispute resolution and thus the 
Board was not called upon to determine whether the third 
requirement for section 10(k) jurisdiction was satisfied.  Id. at 
918. 
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Motor Co., 441 U.S. at 497 (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The Board properly exercised 
jurisdiction pursuant to section 10(k) when it issued the 
December 31, 2007 order awarding the disputed work to 
Carpenters.  Accordingly, Sheet Metal’s contention that it 
could not properly have been found to violate section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(D) because the Board lacked the authority to issue 
its work assignment order is without merit.  The Board’s 
petition to enforce the December 8, 2011 order cannot be 
denied on that ground.  
 
B. 
 
 Sheet Metal argues in the alternative that even if the 
Board had jurisdiction to issue the section 10(k) award, it 
erred in concluding that Sheet Metal violated section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(D) by maintaining the section 301 suit against 
Donnelly after December 31, 2007, the date of the Board’s 
section 10(k) determination awarding the disputed work to 
Carpenters.
16
  See Sheet Metal, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 131, at *3.  
                                              
 
16
  As the Board correctly pointed out, Sheet Metal’s 
section 301 suit became an unfair labor practice only after the 
December 31, 2007 section 10(k) decision issued.  See Sheet 
Metal, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 131, at *5; see also Local Union No. 
7, ILWU, 291 N.L.R.B. 89, 92 (1988).  Common sense 
establishes that Sheet Metal’s section 301 suit could not be 
found to conflict with a prior order of the Board, and thus 
could not be “coerc[ive]” within the meaning of section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(D), until the Board actually issued an order with 
which the suit could conflict.   
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In holding that Sheet Metal committed an unfair labor 
practice, the Board reasoned: 
 
It is well established that a 
union’s lawsuit to obtain work 
awarded by the Board under 
Section 10(k) to a different group 
of employees, or monetary 
damages in lieu of the work, has 
an illegal objective for purposes 
of Bill Johnson’s [Restaurants, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 
(1983)] footnote 5 and violates 
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D).  
Accordingly, we affirm the 
[ALJ’s] finding that, following 
the Board’s 10(k) award, [Sheet 
Metal’s] maintenance of its 301 
lawsuit was incompatible with the 
Board’s award and, therefore, had 
an objective that was illegal under 
Federal law. 
 
Id.  The Board rejected Sheet Metal’s argument that the suit 
was permissible because it sought “damages only for breach 
of the PLA, not pay-in-lieu of assignment of the work.”  Id.  
The Board explained that the effect of Sheet Metal’s request 
for damages, rather than the disputed work itself, was “the 
same as the first amended complaint’s request that Donnelly 
pay damages for assigning the work to employees represented 
by [Carpenters],” and thus Sheet Metal’s attempt to 
distinguish its suit from one for pay-in-lieu of work was a 
“distinction without a difference.”  Id.  The Board also 
25 
 
reversed the ALJ’s finding that Sheet Metal was entitled to a 
declaratory judgment validating the Aiges arbitration award, 
because, “[i]f granted, a declaration validating the finding that 
Donnelly breached the PLA by assigning the work to the 
Carpenters-represented employees would also directly 
conflict with the 10(k) award.”  Id. at *4.  The Board thus 
ordered Sheet Metal to “withdraw its lawsuit against 
Donnelly in its entirety.”17  Id.  “We review to determine 
                                              
 
17
  The Board reversed the ALJ’s decision with respect 
to Sambe, finding, contrary to the ALJ’s determination, that 
Sheet Metal’s pursuit of a breach of contract claim against 
Sambe did not constitute an unfair labor practice.  See Sheet 
Metal, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 131, at *2.  The Board explained 
that “because Sambe did not assign the disputed work directly 
to employees, an award against Sambe would not be 
inconsistent with the Board’s 10(k) award.”  Id.   
 
 Sambe does not petition for review of this portion of 
the Board’s decision, and in fact acknowledges that the 
Board’s section 10(k) order “does not automatically bar 
[Sheet Metal’s] breach of contract claim against Sambe – 
because it was Donnelly and not Sambe that assigned the 
disputed work . . . .”  (Sambe Combined Third Step Br. 2.)  
Sambe also acknowledges that a suit for contract damages can 
be maintained against general contractors even after the 
Board issues a section 10(k) award assigning the disputed 
work to another union, but argues that this “exception” does 
not apply here, and thus the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment for Sheet Metal on its breach of contract 
claim against Sambe.  (Sambe Combined Third Step Br. 33.)  
We address this argument in Part III(B) infra, in our 
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whether the Board’s finding rests on a reasonable 
interpretation of the Act.”  Gundle II, 1 F.3d at 1426.  
 
 Section 301 of the LMRA authorizes “[s]uits for 
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 
organization representing employees in an industry affecting 
commerce . . . or between any such labor organizations . . . .”  
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).  A section 301 lawsuit may be enjoined 
as an unfair labor practice pursuant to section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) in 
certain circumstances.  In Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983), the Supreme Court outlined a 
two-prong test for determining whether a lawsuit constitutes 
an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D).  
See id. at 744.  Under the Bill Johnson’s “improper 
motivation” test, “before a civil suit can be enjoined, both an 
improper motivation and a lack of reasonable legal basis for 
the suit must be demonstrated.”  Hoeber v. Local 30, United 
Slate Tile & Composition Roofers, 939 F.2d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 
1991) (“Gundle I”); see Bill Johnson’s, 461 U.S. at 744.  The 
Bill Johnson’s Court recognized that an exception exists, 
however, where the lawsuit “has an objective that is illegal 
under federal law.”18  461 U.S. at 737 n.5.   
                                                                                                     
discussion of the parties’ appeals from the District Court’s 
orders.    
 
 
18
  Although the Supreme Court’s statement in footnote 
5 of Bill Johnson’s is technically dictum, we have explained 
that the Court’s “dicta are highly persuasive” and are not to 
be viewed lightly.  Galli v. New Jersey Meadlowlands 
Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2007); see also In re 
McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2000).  Moreover, as 
discussed infra, the “illegal objective” exception articulated 
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 We have observed that “[s]ince [Bill Johnson’s], other 
courts of appeals and the Board have agreed that pursuit of a 
section 301 breach of contract suit that directly conflicts with 
a section 10(k) determination has an illegal objective and is 
enjoinable as an unfair labor practice under section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(D).”  Gundle II, 1 F.3d at 1426.  We joined those 
other Courts of Appeals in the Gundle trilogy of cases.  See 
Gundle I;  Gundle II, 1 F.3d at 1427-29; United Union of 
Roofers, Local Union No. 30 v. Gundle Lining Constr. Corp., 
1 F.3d 1429 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Gundle III”).  We revisit the 
issue now to clarify our jurisprudence.   
  
 The Gundle cases, as here, involved a work dispute 
between an employer, Gundle Lining Construction 
Corporation, and two unions, Local 30 and Local 172.  See 
Gundle I, 939 F.2d at 119.  Gundle had a contract to perform 
liner installation work at a New Jersey county landfill and 
subcontracted the work to Local 30 via a “Memorandum 
Agreement” in which it also became a party to Local 30’s 
CBA.  Id. at 119-120.  After the project was completed, 
Gundle began another project at the landfill, for which it hired 
Local 172, rather than Local 30, to perform the lining work.  
See id. at 120.  “Local 30 took the position that this work was 
covered by the Memorandum Agreement, and therefore that 
Gundle was contractually bound to hire Local 30’s workers.”  
Id.  When work began on the second project, Local 30 
employees picketed the worksite.  Id.   
 
                                                                                                     
in footnote five has achieved the status of law in the majority 
of the Courts of Appeals.   
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 In response, Gundle filed an unfair labor practice 
charge against Local 30, alleging that the union violated 
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) of the NLRA by picketing the worksite.  
Id.  Local 30, in turn, filed a grievance with the Joint 
Conference Board (“JCB”) pursuant to its CBA, alleging that 
Gundle breached the Memorandum Agreement by hiring 
Local 172 for the second landfill project.  Id.  In January, 
1990, the JCB issued an award in Local 30’s favor, finding 
that Gundle violated the Memorandum Agreement and was 
required to compensate Local 30 employees.  Id.  Local 30 
subsequently filed a section 301 lawsuit seeking to enforce 
the JCB’s arbitration award.  Id.  In June, 1990, the NLRB 
“issued its 10(k) decision, awarding the disputed work to 
Local 172.”  Id.  Local 30 continued to pursue its section 301 
suit, and the NLRB petitioned under section 10(l) of the 
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(l), to temporarily enjoin the suit until 
the NLRB issued its decision resolving Gundle’s unfair labor 
practice charge.  See id. at 121.  The District Court denied the 
petition for injunctive relief, and the NLRB appealed.  See id. 
at 122.  
 
 We reviewed the Board’s appeal in Gundle I, where 
we ultimately affirmed the District Court’s denial of the 
Board’s petition for an injunction.  See id. at 128.  In so 
holding, we explained that “[i]n a § 10(l) injunction 
proceeding, our standard of review involves three separate 
determinations – determinations that the district court must 
make before it may issue a § 10(l) injunction.”  Id. at 123.  
First, we reviewed de novo “the district court’s determination 
as to whether there [was] a substantial legal theory explicit or 
implicit in the case that would support a finding that an unfair 
labor practice had occurred.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
deleted).  We concluded that the Board’s theory that “the 
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filing and prosecution of Local 30’s lawsuit is inherently 
coercive, because it brings pressure to bear on Gundle to 
reassign its linear installation work from Local 172 to Local 
30” was “on its face” sufficient to establish “a substantial and 
nonfrivolous legal theory on the basis of which Local 30’s § 
301 enforcement lawsuit could possibly constitute an unfair 
labor practice.”  Id. at 123-24.   
 
 Having found that a substantial legal theory existed, 
we then “appl[ied] a deferential standard of review” to the 
District Court’s determination that the second requirement for 
injunctive relief – a showing that the facts of the case fit the 
Board’s legal theory – was not satisfied.  Id. at 123.  We 
concluded that the District Court did not clearly err in finding 
the Board “failed to demonstrate that the facts of th[e] case fit 
within [its] theory” that Local 30 was acting to coerce Gundle 
into reassigning the disputed work through its section 301 suit 
and thus the suit was not enjoinable under the Bill Johnson’s 
“improper motivation” test.   Id. at 124, 128.  We explained:  
 
[I]f we were to hold that Local 
30’s lawsuit necessarily 
constitutes improper coercion, we 
would be creating a rule under 
which an employer could 
unilaterally avoid a union contract 
. . . Such a result does not reflect 
the intent of Congress in creating 
the mechanism of the 10(l) 
injunction, and we will not permit 
§ 10(l) to be abused in such a 
manner.  There may well be 
circumstances – such as those 
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described by the Supreme Court 
in Bill Johnson’s – in which a 
lawsuit is used improperly or 
coercively.  This is not such a 
case, however, and the district 
court’s findings of fact on this 
issue are not clearly erroneous.  
 
See id. at 125.   
 
 Finally, we reviewed the third factor that is considered 
in determining whether to grant injunctive relief pursuant to 
section 10(l): the District Court’s “discretionary decision” to 
grant injunctive relief upon finding that it is “the just and 
proper remedy.”  Id. at 123, 125 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Reviewing for abuse of discretion, we concluded 
that “there [were] at least three reasons why the [District 
Court’s] denial of injunctive relief was proper.”  Id. at 126.   
 
First, the Congressional purpose 
behind the enactment of § 10(l) 
was not to enjoin legal action, but 
was rather to enjoin clear 
obstacles and impediments to 
business, such as strikes, pickets, 
and boycotts. . . . Therefore, the 
district court, in focusing on the 
large objectives of the Act, 
correctly held that prosecution of 
Local 30’s suit did not create the 
degree of harm necessary to 
justify an injunction. . . . 
[Second,] [i]njunctive relief under 
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10(l) is only a temporary measure. 
. . . Since Gundle would still risk 
a later revival of the lawsuit, any 
incentive that Gundle presently 
has to reassign the work to Local 
30 so as to avoid double liability 
would continue even if the 
injunction issued. . . . Third, the 
substantive arguments that the 
NLRB and Gundle raise before us 
could all have been raised as a 
defense in Local 30’s § 301 suit 
which seeks to enforce the 
[JCB’s] decision in favor of Local 
30. . . . An injunction is thus not 
the only means by which the 
Board could achieve its objective 
– and indeed . . . injunctions 
against the prosecution of a 
lawsuit are a highly disfavored 
remedy. 
 
Id. at 126-27 (internal quotation marks and citations deleted).  
We thus declined in Gundle I to disturb the District Court’s 
denial of injunctive relief.  Id. at 128. 
 
 On July 20, 1992, the NLRB rendered its decision on 
Gundle’s unfair labor practice charge, holding that Local 30 
committed unfair labor practices in violation of section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(D) “by picketing and maintaining its section 301 
suit” after the Board’s section 10(k) order issued, and further 
ordering Local 30 to withdraw the suit.  See Gundle II, 1 F.3d 
at 1422.  Local 30 petitioned for review, and the Board cross-
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petitioned for enforcement.  See id. at 1420.  We reviewed 
these petitions in Gundle II, where we explained that the 
“[t]he crux of the issue . . . [was] whether the arbitration 
award for Local 30 is inconsistent with or contrary to the 
Board’s assignment of the work to Local 172” such that Local 
30’s suit to enforce the award constituted an unfair labor 
practice under Bill Johnson’s “illegal objective” exception.  
Id. at 1427.   
 
 We answered this question in the affirmative and 
expressly rejected Local 30’s argument that its section 301 
suit was not contrary to the Board’s section 10(k) decision 
because the suit did not seek the disputed work, but instead 
sought to enforce an arbitration award for pay-in-lieu of work 
damages.  See id.  In so holding, we explained that “[t]he 
distinction Local 30 seeks to draw between seeking the work 
and seeking payment for the work is ephemeral.”  Id.  We 
relied on our rationale in NLRB v. Local 1291, Int’l 
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 368 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. 
denied, 386 U.S. 1033 (1967), that  
 
the valuable part of a right to a 
particular job is the right to be 
paid for it.  Thus, a jurisdictional 
dispute between two groups of 
employees as to which is entitled 
to certain work is in essence a 
dispute as to which shall receive 
compensation for that work.  The 
opportunity sought to perform 
labor is significant only as a 
means of obtaining compensation.  
It follows that if workmen, who 
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are entitled to a job under the 
terms of the labor contract, agree 
to forego the obligation of 
working but not the concomitant 
right to payment, they have not 
disclaimed any significant right. 
 
Gundle II, 1 F.3d at 1427-28 (quoting Local 1291, 368 F.2d at 
110). We emphasized that making a distinction between 
seeking the work from seeking damages for not receiving the 
work would be inconsistent with Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).  There, the Supreme Court held 
that a Board’s ruling “take[s] precedence” over a conflicting 
arbitration award.  Gundle II, 1 F.3d at 1428 (quoting Carey, 
375 U.S. at 272).  Finding that Local 30’s section 301 suit 
conflicted with the Board’s prior section 10(k) award because 
it sought to enforce an arbitration award “to recover damages 
for work awarded to another union,” we thus upheld “the 
Board’s interpretation of the Act to treat maintenance of the 
section 301 lawsuit to enforce an arbitration award against 
Gundle for pay-in-lieu of work as an unfair labor practice.”  
Id. at 1428-29.   
 
 Sheet Metal acknowledges that the majority of Courts 
of Appeals, including our Court, have held that “‘there is no 
material difference between seeking work and seeking 
payment in lieu of work.’”19  (Sheet Metal B. Br. 36) (quoting 
                                              
19
  Since our decisions in the Gundle cases, the 
majority of our sister Courts of Appeals have likewise held 
that a section 301 suit for damages or to enforce an 
arbitrator’s award of pay-in-lieu of work constitutes an unfair 
labor practice where the suit directly conflicts with a section 
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Gundle II, 1 F.3d at 1427-28).  But according to Sheet Metal, 
Gundle II is not controlling because it does not involve a PLA 
and is “inconsistent” with Gundle I.  (Sheet Metal B. Br. 37.)  
Sheet Metal thus urges this Court to hold that a section 301 
                                                                                                     
10(k) determination by the Board.  See, e.g., T. Equip. Corp. 
v. Mass. Laborers’ Dist. Council, 166 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 
1999) (“We agree with the Third Circuit that there can be no 
logical distinction between ‘seeking the work and seeking 
payment for the work.’”) (citing Gundle II, 1 F.3d at 1427); 
ILWU v. N.L.R.B., 884 F.2d 1407, 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(“[I]f petitioners were entitled to assert contract claims 
against [a union the Board deemed entitled to disputed work 
in a section 10(k) proceeding], in contravention of the 
Board’s section 10(k) award, the very purpose of section 
10(k) – to authorize the Board to resolve the jurisdictional 
dispute – would be totally frustrated . . . [W]hatever [a] 
union’s motivation and no matter how persuasive its 
contractual case, a union cannot force an employer to choose 
between a Board section 10(k) award and a squarely contrary 
contract claim.”); see also Small v. Operative Plasterers’ & 
Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n Local 200, 611 F.3d 483, 492-93 
(9th Cir. 2010); UAW & its Local 1519 v. Rockwell Int’l 
Corp., 619 F.2d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 1980).  The Board, “whose 
construction of the Act is entitled to deference,” Gundle II, 1 
F.3d at 1428, has similarly held that a section 301 suit that 
conflicts with a section 10(k) order constitutes an unfair labor 
practice under the NLRA.  See, e.g., Sheet Metal, 357 
N.L.R.B. No. 131, at *3; ILWU, Local 13, 290 N.L.R.B. 616, 
616-17 (1988), enf’d 884 F.3d at 1413-14; Local 32, ILWU, 
271 N.L.R.B. 759, 763 (1984), enf’d sub nom. ILWU, Local 
32 v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 773 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied 476 U.S. 1158 (1986). 
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suit for breach of contract damages is permissible, even in the 
face of a conflicting section 10(k) award by the Board, where 
it seeks merely damages, not the disputed work itself.  The 
Board, for its part, argues that Sheet Metal’s position “is 
premised on a theory squarely rejected by this Court[] . . . in 
Gundle [II].”  (Board Br. 21.)  The Board concludes that, 
under Gundle II and the Board’s own precedent, it 
“reasonably found that [Sheet Metal’s] lawsuit, seeking pay 
for work that the Board awarded to the Carpenters, is 
incompatible with the Section 10(k) Determination, and 
therefore has an objective that is illegal under federal law.”  
(Board Br. 20) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 
 We agree with the Board that Gundle II controls the 
disposition of this appeal.  Gundle II is not, as Sheet Metal 
suggests, “inconsistent” with Gundle I merely because in the 
latter we stated in dicta that “‘we cannot agree with the 
NLRB that seeking enforcement of an arbitral award based on 
a breach of contract to assign work is identical to seeking the 
disputed work itself.’”  (Sheet Metal B. Br. 37) (quoting 
Gundle I, 939 F.2d at 124 n.10).  We made this statement in 
the context of reviewing the District Court’s conclusion that 
the Board failed to satisfy second requirement for obtaining 
injunctive relief, i.e., demonstrating that the facts of the case 
supported the Board’s articulated legal theory that Local 30’s 
section 301 suit had an improper motivation and thus 
constituted an unfair labor practice.  See Gundle I, 939 F.2d at 
124.  In this procedural posture, we were required to “uphold 
the district court’s finding that Local 30’s § 301 suit was not 
improperly motivated unless that finding [was] clearly 
erroneous.”  Id. at 125.  In Gundle II, on the other hand, we 
were required to defer to “the Board’s interpretation of the 
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Act to treat maintenance of the section 301 lawsuit to enforce 
an arbitration award against Gundle for pay-in-lieu of work as 
an unfair labor practice” so long as that interpretation was 
reasonable.  See 1 F.3d at 1429.  Thus, our seemingly 
inconsistent statements in Gundle I and Gundle II as to the 
propriety of section 301 suits for breach of contract damages 
in the face of a conflicting 10(k) award are explained, in part, 
by the highly deferential standards of review we appropriately 
applied in each case, standards which required us to defer to 
the differing conclusions of the District Court and Board, 
respectively.  
 
 Moreover, as we pointed out in Gundle II, the 
statements in Gundle I concerning why Local 30’s section 
301 suit for breach of contract damages did not satisfy the Bill 
Johnson’s “improper motivation” test are “not controlling” in 
cases such as Gundle II, where a party seeks to enjoin a 
section 301 suit under the “illegal objective” exception.  Id. at 
1429 n.13.  The “improper motivation” and “illegal 
objective” tests require different showings in order to 
establish that the suit in question is enjoinable pursuant to 
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D), and thus the Gundle I Court’s 
statements concerning whether a section 301 suit for breach 
of contract damages satisfies the “improper motivation” test 
are not dispositive in determining whether the same suit may 
alternatively be enjoined under the “illegal objective” 
exception.
20
  See Bill Johnson’s, 461 U.S. at 737 n.5, 744.  
                                              
 
20
  The Gundle I Court never considered whether Local 
30’s suit could have been enjoined under the “illegal 
objective” exception, nor should it have, for our charge in that 
case was solely to review the propriety of the District Court’s 
decision to deny the Board’s petition for an injunction.  As 
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Furthermore, because “a section 10(l) proceeding is 
independent of the proceeding on the merits,” any 
“speculation” we expressed in Gundle I concerning Local 
30’s ability to obtain contract damages against Gundle in the 
face of a contrary 10(k) decision by the Board “is not binding 
on us in the context of an appeal on the merits.”21  Gundle II, 
1 F.3d at 1425 n.9.  Indeed, although in Gundle I we 
                                                                                                     
discussed supra, the District Court concluded that the second 
requirement for injunctive relief was not satisfied because the 
Board failed to show that the facts of the case satisfied the 
legal theory that the suit was enjoinable under the “improper 
motivation” test proffered by the Board.  See Gundle I, 939 
F.2d at 124-25.  The Gundle I Court was only called upon to 
consider the “improper motivation” test and, except upon a 
finding of clear error, was required to defer to the District 
Court’s conclusion that the facts of the case did not fit that 
legal theory.  See id. at 123.    
 
 
21
  Sheet Metal also attempts to distinguish Gundle II 
on the ground that the section 301 suit at issue in that case 
was premised upon an alleged breach of Local 30’s CBA, 
whereas Sheet Metal’s section 301 suit, in contrast, is 
predicated upon a purported breach of the PLA.  However, 
the PLA is a type of CBA, and thus we cannot agree that 
Gundle II is distinguishable simply because it involved a 
CBA rather than a PLA. See N.J.S.A. § 52:38-2 (“‘Project 
labor agreement’ means a form of pre-hire collective 
bargaining agreement covering terms and conditions of a 
specific project.”); see also Phoenix Eng’g, Inc. v. MK-
Ferguson of Oak Ridge Co., 966 F.2d 1513, 1518 (6th Cir. 
1992). 
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expressed doubt about the propriety of a section 301 suit to 
enforce an arbitration award where the Board has issued a 
section 10(k) order, we expressly left open the question of 
whether an arbitration award that conflicts with a 10(k) order 
of the Board is an unfair labor practice pursuant to section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(D).  See Gundle I, 939 F.2d at 124 n.10 (“We 
express no opinion, of course, on the merits of Local 30’s 
enforcement action.”).  We answered this question in the 
affirmative in Gundle II, where, considering the merits of 
Local 30’s section 301 suit to enforce the arbitration award, 
we held in no uncertain terms that a section 301 suit for 
breach of contract damages is identical to seeking the 
disputed work and is thus “coercive” for the purposes of 
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D).  See Gundle II, 1 F.3d at 1427-29.  
Thus, it is our more recent holding in Gundle II, rather than 
our earlier dicta in Gundle I, that controls.   See ACLU of N.J. 
ex rel. Lander v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 98 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1999) (“[I]t is the tradition of this court that the holding of a 
panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels . . 
. [W]e have repeatedly held that dicta are not binding.”) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
 Twenty years ago, we warned that “if a union is 
permitted to recover damages for work awarded to another 
union in a section 10(k) proceeding, the policy underlying 
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) of protecting employers from the 
detrimental impact of jurisdictional disputes would be 
severely undermined.”  Gundle II, 1 F.3d at 1428.  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Carey, the section 10(k) 
grievance procedure furthers the policies of the Act and 
effectuates Congress’s intent in enacting the NLRA to 
“actively encourage[] voluntary settlements of work 
assignment controversies between unions.”  See 375 U.S. at 
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266.  These policy concerns, which motivated our decision in 
Gundle II, are equally persuasive today.  Heeding the 
principles of stare decisis that guide our jurisprudence, we 
thus hold, in accordance with our two decade-old precedent, 
that the Board’s interpretation of the Act at issue here – 
treating the pursuit of a lawsuit for pay-in-lieu of work in the 
face of a contrary work assignment order of the Board as an 
unfair labor practice – is a reasonable one.  See Morrow v. 
Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 182 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Smith, 
J., concurring) (“Absent . . . exceptional intervening 
developments, the essence of stare decisis is that the mere 
existence of [our precedent] becomes a reason for adhering to 
[its] holding[] in subsequent cases.”) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
 We take this opportunity to clarify, however, that our 
holding applies to suits for damages against the employer that 
made the disputed work assignment and thus becomes subject 
to the conflicting demands of section 301 suit for damages, on 
one hand, and the Board’s 10(k) order, on the other.  Since 
our decision in Gundle II, the Board and other Courts of 
Appeals have so distinguished between suits for contract 
damages against contractors not responsible for making the 
disputed work assignment and suits against the assigning 
employer, declining to extend our holding in Gundle II to 
prohibit suits against the non-assigning contractors.  See, e.g., 
Local Union 33, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 
289 N.L.R.B. 1482, 1484 (1988); Miron Constr. Co., Inc. v. 
Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 139, 44 F.3d 558, 
565-67 (7th Cir. 1995).  We are persuaded by their reasoning.  
As the Seventh Circuit explained in Miron,  
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a union’s mere pursuit of its 
contractual remedies against the 
general contractor, absent a 
demand that the subcontractor 
reassign the work, does not 
amount to coercion in 
contravention of the § 10(k) 
award.  Since the subcontractor 
has complete control over which 
union actually performs the work, 
maintenance of an action against 
the general contractor cannot be 
viewed as a veiled attempt to 
force a reassignment of the work.  
The element of coercion is what 
distinguishes [a suit against a 
general contractor] from [that at 
issue in Gundle II]. 
 
44 F.3d at 566; see also Advance Cast Stone Co. v. Bridge, 
Structural & Reinforcing Iron Workers, Local Union No. 1, 
376 F.3d 734, 742 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a suit 
against the contractor who did not make the disputed work 
assignment “[does] not implicate the general principle that the 
NLRB’s § 10(k) determination takes precedence over an 
arbitrator’s award”).   
 
 We therefore conclude that the Board’s interpretation 
of the Act as prohibiting maintenance of Sheet Metal’s 
section 301 lawsuit to seek contract damages and enforce the 
Aiges arbitration award against Donnelly was not erroneous 
as a matter of law.  See Gundle II, 1 F.3d at 1429.  
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Accordingly, we will deny Sheet Metal’s petition for review 
and grant the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement.  
 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDERS 
 
 Finally, we turn to the parties’ appeals from the 
District Court’s orders denying Sambe’s and Donnelly’s 
motions to vacate the Aiges arbitration award, and granting 
summary judgment in favor of Sheet Metal on its breach of 
contract claims against Sambe and Donnelly.  The District 
Court had jurisdiction under section 301 of the LMRA, 29 
U.S.C. § 185(a), and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.    
 
A. 
 
 Sambe and Donnelly first moved to vacate the Aiges 
arbitration award pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 
U.S.C. § 10, in October, 2007.  After the Board issued its 
section 10(k) order granting the disputed work to Carpenters, 
Donnelly filed a supplement to its cross-motion to vacate, 
arguing that the section 10(k) decision precluded the District 
Court from granting Sheet Metal’s request to enforce the 
Aiges award and seeking vacatur of the award.  On March 27, 
2008, the District Court denied the motions to vacate because 
“it disagree[d] with the implied end of Donnelly’s position – 
that there is no monetary remedy for [Sheet Metal] even if the 
PLA is valid and [Sambe and Donnelly] breached that 
contract.”  (D.C. J.A. 21.)  We exercise de novo review over a 
district court’s denial of a motion to vacate an arbitration 
award.  See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 
2003).  
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 We agree with Sambe and Donnelly that the District 
Court erred when it refused to vacate the Aiges award.  It is 
well-established that where an arbitration award squarely 
conflicts with a later Board ruling, the arbitration award must 
yield to the Board’s decision.  This principle derives from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), where the Court stated in dicta 
that “[s]hould the Board disagree with [an] arbiter . . . the 
Board’s ruling would, of course, take precedence,” because 
“[t]he superior authority of the Board may be invoked at any 
time.”  Id. at 272.  Relying upon the Supreme Court’s dicta in 
Carey, the majority of the Courts of Appeals have since held 
that a section 10(k) award nullifies a contrary arbitration 
award.  See, e.g., Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 773 F.2d at 1021 (“The 
policies underlying the supremacy doctrine, as enunciated by 
the Supreme Court in Carey and the overwhelming body of 
circuit and district court decisions, indicate that a section 
10(k) decision must be given precedence over an arbitrator’s 
contrary decision.”); see also Teamsters Union Local No. 115 
v. DeSoto, Inc., 725 F.2d 931, 936 (3d Cir. 1984); Local 
1519, 619 F.2d at 583; Local 7-210, Oil, Chemical & Atomic 
Workers v. Union Tank Car Co., 475 F.2d 194, 199 (7th Cir. 
1973); New Orleans Typographical Union No. 17 v. NLRB, 
368 F.2d 755, 767 (5th Cir. 1966).  The appropriate remedy, 
then, is to vacate the conflicting arbitration award.  See T. 
Equip. Corp., 166 F.3d at 19; see also Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 773 
F.2d at 1020.  
 
 The Aiges arbitration award squarely conflicted with 
the Board’s section 10(k) decision by holding, contrary to the 
section 10(k) order, that Sheet Metal was entitled to the 
disputed work and by directing that the work be reassigned 
“to members of Sheet Metal Workers Local 27.”  (D.C. J.A. 
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296.)  Thus, the District Court was required as a matter of law 
to vacate the Aiges award and erred by declining to do so.  
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order of 
March 27, 2008 and remand with directions to vacate the 
Aiges arbitration award. 
 
B. 
 
 We turn next to Donnelly’s, Sambe’s, and Sheet 
Metal’s respective appeals from the District Court’s orders 
granting summary judgment in favor of Sheet Metal.  We 
review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de 
novo, “applying the same standard as the District Court.”  Pa. 
Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995).  “This 
requires that we view the underlying facts and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion.”  Id.  Summary judgment is proper 
where no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact, and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   
 
1. 
 
 As to Donnelly’s appeal, affirmance of the Board’s 
decision and order of December 8, 2011, compels reversal of 
the District Court’s entry of judgment in favor of Sheet Metal.  
As we explained in Gundle III, it follows from our decision to 
enforce an order of the Board finding that a union committed 
an unfair labor practice by maintaining a section 301 suit that 
directly conflicts with a section 10(k) award that the union “is 
prohibited from the continued maintenance of [its] section 
301 suit.”  1 F.3d at 1430.  Accordingly, we will vacate the 
orders of the District Court granting summary judgment in 
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favor of Sheet Metal and finding Donnelly liable for breach 
of contract damages in the amount of $365,349.75, and 
remand with directions to enter judgment in favor or 
Donnelly.  See id.; see also New Orleans Typographical 
Union No. 17, 368 F.2d at 768.   
  
2. 
 
 Finally, we turn to Sambe’s and Sheet Metal’s appeals 
from the District Court’s orders granting summary judgment 
in favor of Sheet Metal on its breach of contract claim and 
awarding Sheet Metal nominal damages of $1.00.  To prevail 
on a breach of contract claim under New Jersey law, a 
plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) the existence of a 
valid contract between the parties; (2) failure of the defendant 
to perform its obligations under the contract; and (3) a causal 
relationship between the breach and the plaintiff’s alleged 
damages.
22
  See Coyle v. Englander's, 488 A.2d 1083, 1088 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).  The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey has instructed that “[w]here the terms of a contract are 
clear and unambiguous there is no room for interpretation or 
construction and we must enforce those terms as written.”  
Kutzin v. Pirnie, 591 A.2d 933, 936 (1991) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Tamarind Resort 
Assocs. v. Gov’t of V.I., 138 F.3d 107, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(“We have consistently embraced the basic common law 
principle that a contract is unambiguous if it is reasonably 
capable of only one construction.”).  “We therefore will 
affirm a grant of summary judgment in a breach of contract 
action only where the contract is unambiguous and the 
                                              
 
22
  There is no dispute that New Jersey law governs the 
contract claims herein.  
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moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Tamarind Resort Assocs., 138 F.3d at 111.   
 
 In reviewing Sheet Metal’s motion for summary 
judgment, the District Court determined that only the first two 
elements of the breach of contract claim were at issue because 
it was “undisputed that [Sheet Metal] suffered damages from 
the assignment of the roofing work to another union.”  Sheet 
Metal I, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 319.  The District Court held that 
the second element was satisfied as a matter of law because 
the Aiges award finding that Sambe violated the PLA by 
assigning the work to Carpenters was entitled to preclusive 
effect, and thus the District Court was bound by that 
conclusion.  Id. at 322.  The District Court rejected Sambe’s 
argument that the Aiges award was not enforceable because it 
conflicted with the Board’s 10(k) determination.  See id. at 
320 n.10.   
 
 The District Court alternatively held that, even if the 
Aiges award did not have preclusive effect, “the undisputed 
evidence demonstrates” that Sambe breached the PLA by 
failing to assure that Donnelly complied with the Agreement, 
as required by Article 3, Section 1.
23
  Id. at 322 n.16.  The 
                                              
 
23
  Article 3, section 1 provides in pertinent part: 
 
[T]he General Contractor shall 
require all Contractors of 
whatever tier who have been 
awarded contracts for the work 
covered by this Agreement, to 
accept and be bound by the terms 
and conditions of this Project 
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District Court determined, without further explanation, that 
“[a]lthough Sambe argues that it discharged its contractual 
duty by requiring Donnelly to execute the Letter of Assent, 
the PLA clearly required Sambe to ‘assure [Donnelly’s] 
compliance,’ which, it is undisputed, it did not do.”  Id.  The 
District Court thus concluded that “there is no genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether Sambe . . . failed to perform 
[its] PLA obligations,” and Sambe was liable for breach of 
contract as a matter of law.  Id.  
 
 Sambe challenges the District Court’s conclusion that 
the Aiges award was entitled to preclusive effect and thus the 
second element of Sheet Metal’s breach of contract claim was 
satisfied as a matter of law.  According to Sambe, the Aiges 
award should not have been given preclusive effect because it 
conflicted with the Board’s section 10(k) order, and therefore 
it should have been vacated and could not have formed the 
basis for Sambe’s breach of contract liability.  We agree.  For 
the reasons discussed in parts II(B) and III(A) supra, the 
District Court was required to vacate the Aiges arbitration 
award following the Board’s section 10(k) decision, and 
committed reversible error by failing to do so.   
 
                                                                                                     
Agreement by executing the 
Letter of Assent (Attachment A) 
prior to commencing work.  The 
General Contractor shall assure 
compliance with this Agreement 
by the Contractors.  
 
(B. J.A. 103.) 
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 It does not follow, however, that Sambe is absolved of 
contract liability under Gundle II.  Sambe acknowledges that 
Gundle II does not apply to Sheet Metal’s suit against Sambe 
“in the same manner respecting Donnelly,” but urges this 
Court to apply Gundle II to find that Sheet Metal was 
prohibited from continuing its section 301 suit against both 
Donnelly and Sambe.  (Sambe Combined Third Step Br. 33.)  
 
 We will not do so.  As we explained in part II(B) 
supra, there is a distinction between a breach of contract suit 
against the assigning employer and one against an employer 
with no authority to assign the disputed work.  Contrary to 
Sambe’s suggestion, this is a distinction with “relevance” and 
one that has significant “bearing upon the facts of the instant 
matter.”  (Sambe Combined Third Step Br. 35.)  As the 
general contractor on the Project, with no power to make or 
amend the disputed work assignment, Sambe was not subject 
to the “conflicting demands” of an order by the Board, on the 
one hand, or complying with an arbitration order contrary to a 
decision of the Board, on the other.  See Local 33, 289 
N.L.R.B. at 1483.  Thus, we cannot agree with Sambe that the 
District Court erred by refusing to find that Sheet Metal was 
prohibited from continuing its section 301 suit against Sambe 
after the Board’s 10(k) decision issued.  
 
 We do find, however, that the District Court erred in 
its alternative holding that even if the Aiges award did not 
have preclusive effect, summary judgment was warranted 
because there was “no genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether Sambe” failed to satisfy its obligation under Article 
3, section 1 of assuring Donnelly’s compliance with the PLA.  
Sheet Metal I, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 322 n.16.  First, as Sambe 
points out, the word “assure” is “susceptible to more than one 
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interpretation.”  (Sambe D.C. First Step Br. 50.)  The phrase 
“assure compliance” could be interpreted as a guarantee that 
Sambe’s subcontractors would adhere to all terms of the PLA.  
But the phrase “assure compliance” may also reasonably be 
interpreted to mean that Sambe would procure its 
subcontractors’ assent to the PLA, thereby “assuring” that 
they, too, were bound by the PLA’s terms.  Because the 
phrase “assure compliance” is ambiguous, summary 
adjudication of the contract claim against Sambe was 
foreclosed.  See Tamarind Resort Assocs., 138 F.3d at 111. 
 
 Furthermore, the District Court erred by finding that 
there existed no genuine dispute of material fact concerning 
whether Sambe “assure[d]” Donnelly’s compliance with the 
PLA sufficient to defeat Sheet Metal’s summary judgment 
motion.  See Sheet Metal I, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 322 n.16.  The 
record contains evidence that Sambe notified Donnelly of 
Sheet Metal’s claim to the work after Donnelly assigned it to 
Carpenters, and further reflects that Sambe asked Donnelly to 
resolve the claim.  Donnelly then pursued its unfair labor 
practice charge that resulted in the assignment of the work to 
Carpenters.  Thus, contrary to the District Court’s conclusion, 
it is not “undisputed” that Sambe failed to assure Donnelly’s 
compliance with the PLA.  See id.  Rather, there exists a 
genuine dispute of material fact concerning to what extent, if 
at all, Sambe acted to ensure that Donnelly complied with the 
PLA’s hiring requirements, and thus whether Sambe satisfied 
its obligations under the PLA.  Summary judgment was 
therefore improper.    
 
 As such, we hold that although the District Court was 
not required to deny Sheet Metal’s summary judgment 
motion on its contract claim against Sambe on the ground that 
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the suit impermissibly sought breach of contract damages 
from the general contractor following a section 10(k) order of 
the Board, the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment for Sheet Metal because the contract provision at 
issue is ambiguous and, furthermore, there exists a triable 
issue of fact concerning whether Sambe satisfied its 
obligations under the PLA.  Accordingly, we will vacate the 
District Court’s orders granting summary judgment for Sheet 
Metal and awarding it nominal damages of $1.00.  See UPMC 
Health Sys. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 497, 504 (3d Cir. 
2004).  
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Sheet Metal’s 
petition for review of the District Court’s December 8, 2011 
decision and order, and grant the Board’s cross-application 
for enforcement.  We will vacate the orders of the District 
Court with respect to Donnelly and remand with directions to 
enter judgment in favor of Donnelly.  We will likewise vacate 
the orders of the District Court with respect to Sambe and 
remand for the District Court to address the issue of contract 
liability in accordance with this opinion.  
